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Abstract—In this paper, we analyse the impact of DNS-based
filtering on Quality of Experience (QoE). We use three DNS
standard protocols: regular DNS (Do53), DNS over HTTPS
(DoH) and DNS over TLS (DoT) on Quality of Experience. We
conduct measurements against four open public DNS service
providers (Cloudflare, CleanBrowsing, Adguard and Quad9) un-
der three network conditions; Campus wired network, Eduroam
and 4G. We aim to establish whether the filters from the
same provider have statistically significant differences. This
information could be used by Internet users and Internet Service
Providers to make sound decisions when choosing DNS privacy
services. The results show significant DNS response time and
page load time differences between non-filtered and filtered DNS
recursive resolvers from Cloudflare, Adguard and Quad9. We
do not observe significant differences in page load times when
CleanBrowsing resolvers are used despite observing significant
differences in DNS response times. The results further show
that some filters would provide better QoE than non-filtered
counterparts.
Index Terms—Internet performance, DNS privacy, DNS mea-
surements, DNS filtering, QoE, QoP, DoH, DoT, Do53
I. INTRODUCTION
Domain Name System (DNS)[1] is a fundamental compo-
nent of the Internet that maps the human-readable names to
their respective IP addresses of Internet resources. For most
of the Internet’s history, these services have been delivered in
plaintext, providing a fertile ground for attackers to exploit
and compromise Internet users’ security and online privacy
[2]. As a result, various efforts have been developed to
encrypt DNS queries. These efforts have resulted in the
development of different protocols such as DNS over TLS
(DoT) [3], DNS over DTLS, DNS over QUIC, DNS over
HTTPS (DoH)[4], DNSCrypt [5] and DNSCurve [6]. DNS
over HTTPS (DoH) and DNS over TLS (DoT) are the two
newer standard protocols requiring more studies to understand
them fully. Both these protocols encrypt DNS traffic to
improve the privacy of Internet users. Our study focuses on
these two protocols as measured from end-user networks and
devices. We collectively refer to these protocols as DNS-over-
Encryption (DoE), a term that was introduced by Lu et al.
[7]. We use DNS over port 53 (Do53) to refer to the regular,
unencrypted DNS.
Given the recency of DoT and DoH, the Internet mea-
surements research community is yet to establish the real
performance cost of these protocols. At the writing of this
paper, we know of very few measurement studies on the per-
formance cost of DoT and DoH. An early preliminary study
by Mozilla 1 found that DoH lookups are only marginally
1See https://blog.nightly.mozilla.org/2018/08/28/firefox-nightly-secure-
dns-experimental-results
slower (6 ms) than conventional, unencrypted DNS over port
53 (Do53). Bottger et al. [8] studied the DoH ecosystem to
understand the cost of the additional DNS security. Their
findings indicate that the impact is marginal and does not
heavily impact the page load times. In their works, Hounsel
et al. ([9] and [10]) compared the cost of DoT and DoH
measured from campus network and Amazon ec2 instances.
Their results show that despite the lower resolution times of
Do53, DoT and DoH can perform better than Do53 in terms
of page load times. Lu et al. [7] conducted end-to-end DNS-
over-Encryption measurements. They report that generally,
the service quality of DNS-over-Encryption is satisfying in
terms of accessibility and latency. In our prior work[2], we
found that DoT and DoH negatively impact QoE, especially
when the content is hosted offshore using offshore resolvers.
We concluded the study by calling for ISPs and network
operators to implement DoE and hosting services closer to
their subscribers. In the current paper, however, we investigate
whether using filters would improve QoE.
DoH, in particular, is attracting the attention of the research
community due to its current centralised implementation. As
a response, some works focus on de-centralising DoH so that
no single provider has all the browsing information. Hoang
et al. [11] propose K-resolver to slice user information to
different decentralised DoH resolvers. This decentralisation,
however, suffers from increased latency when the servers are
geographically separated. A similar study is conducted by
Hounsel et al.[12] which proposes a distributed DoH server
architecture called M-DNS. However, none of the works so
far has evaluated the cost and potential benefits of DoE-based
filtering on Quality of Experience.
DNS-based filtering is one of the add-on services that
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have been offering to their
subscribers to protect them from malware [13], adware,
botnets [14], [15] phishing, cyberbullying and pornography.
However, RFC 7258 [16] classifies such filtering mechanisms
as pervasive monitoring. This leaves the ISPs in a dilemma
since these mechanisms also protect their infrastructure apart
from protecting their clients. This has led to resistance by
ISPs from adopting DoH, which sends DNS transactions over
HTTP traffic [17]. The Internet research community has tried
and continues to measure the impact of DoE protocols on
QoE. Analysing the ensuing performance impact of such
protocols and their filtering services would be critical to both
ISPs and the end-users.
This paper presents the results of DNS security measure-
ment study taken from 13 vantage points located in 7 African
countries (including the name of the Internet provider): Mada-
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gascar (Widecom), Zambia (MTN, Liquid telecoms), Uganda
(Airtel, Orange), Kenya (Airtel), Nigeria (MTN), Malawi
(TNM, Airtel) and South Africa (Vodacom, Eduroam, Cam-
pus wired network). We conduct the measurements on end-
user devices against 11 resolvers from Four DNS providers;
Adguard [AdGuard Nofilter (AGN), Adblock/Security filter
(AGAd/AGS), AdGuard Family filter (AGF)], CleanBrowsing
[CleanBrowsing Adult filter (CBA), CleanBrowsing Security
filter (CBS), CleanBrowsing Family filter (CBF)], Cloudflare
[Cloudflare Nofilter (CFN), Cloudflare Security filter (CFS),
Cloudflare Family filter (CFF)], and Quad9 [9 Nofilter (Q9N),
Quad9 Security Filter (Q9S)]. We compared the performance
of these resolvers to the local, Do53 resolver provided by the
network.
We perform these measurements on 4G, Eduroam and
Wired networks. We compare the DNS response time and
page load time when different filters are configured. We
measure the performance of both filtered and non-filtered con-
figurations on each recursive resolver on the three protocols;
regular DNS (Do53), DoT and DoH. We further measure
the performance of the local recursive resolver’s non-filtered
Do53 to serve as a baseline. The main objective of this study
is to establish whether DNS filters from the same provider are
significantly different. We further investigate the implication
of DNS response times and page load times.
Contributions: The contributions of this study are as
follows:
• Performance analysis of DoE-based filtering (from the
vantage point of access networks in Africa.) We con-
duct baseline internet measurements from real access
networks in Africa. The results from these measurements
can inform the Internet community on the best DNS
filter provider to use depending on their geolocation and
network conditions. This contribution is two-fold: First,
the ISPs can learn from the performance of these open
public resolvers and implement their own local, filter-
enabled DoE infrastructure, which would reduce latency
to the DoE servers. This would lead to lower DNS
response times and page load times. Secondly, the results
from this study inform the user which filters would result
in better QoE.
• Observations. Using the dataset collected, we compare
the performance impact of DNS-based filtering using
public DoE resolvers. For example, we observe higher
DNS response times from Adguard’s filters. This infor-
mation may help the DNS providers to optimise their
services for networks in Africa.
II. METHODOLOGY
The study uses Alexa’s top 50 global websites for African
countries and the top 50 local ones for each African country
(hosted locally or operated by local entities). The local
websites were particularly included to represent the websites
serving African content and observe how DoT and DoH
impact the browsing QoE on the local websites. We managed
to get 1583 unique websites that we use in this study.
A. Experiment setup
To replicate web browser actions when a user visits a
website, we use automated Firefox 67.0.1 to randomly visit
the websites in our list in headless mode as discussed in prior
works [9], [2] . This is a clean instance without any ad or pop-
up blockers. We, however, install a plugin to export HTTP
Archive (HAR) objects from each visited website. We store
these HARs in a PostgreSQL database as JSON objects. Each
browsing session uses a randomly selected configuration tuple
of the form (domain, recursive resolver, DNS type [Do53,
DoT, DoH]) to measure the QoE impact of each of the
DNS protocols from the 11 public recursive resolvers from
Four DNS providers; Adguard, CleanBrowsing, Cloudflare
and Quad9. Of the four resolvers, two (Cloudflare and Quad9)
negotiate TLS1.3 while CleanBrowsing and AdGuard negoti-
ate TLS1.2
Firefox web browser natively supports Do53 and DoH.
On the other hand, DoT has to be configured on the user’s
machine outside the browser. As such, we use Stubby for
DoT resolution, a stub resolver based on the getdns library.
Stubby listens on a loopback address and responds to Do53
queries. All DNS queries received by Stubby are then sent
out to a configured recursive resolver over DoT. We modify
/etc/resolv.conf on our measurement systems to point to the
loopback address served by Stubby. This forces all DNS
queries initiated by Firefox to be sent over DoT. This ran-
domisation was done to avoid the potential effect of a query
warming the resolver’s cache for subsequent queries from the
other protocols tested.
This measurements study was done in two blocks; 1 March
2020 to 30 August 2020 and 1 June 2021 to 17 June
2021) from 13 end-user vantage points located in 7 countries
under three network conditions, 4G, Eduroam, wired campus
network. We conducted the measurements continuously, with
no delays between successive page loads. The researchers had
access to the vantage points. We ran the measurements on
i5 computers with 8GB of RAM running the Ubuntu 18.04
desktop version.
B. Metrics
This study aimed to understand the impact of DNS filtering
on browsing Quality of Experience (QoE). The study consid-
ered network-level and browser-level metrics. These metrics
are latency, DNS response time (in this paper referred to as
DRT), DNS success and failure rates and page load time
(PLT).
1) Latency: Several studies have pointed out that African
networks suffer high latencies. Recent studies [18], [19], [20]
have attributed these latencies to suboptimal routing, lack
of peering and cache sharing. Other studies have attributed
these latencies to offshore hosting and misconfiguration of
DNS. However, none of these works has looked at the
impact of security protocols on latency in the region. Latency
determines the kind of applications that can run on affected
networks. Therefore, it is important to understand how secure
DNS protocols affect QoE to inform Internet users what
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applications may run on a given network condition. Also,
it is important to show which DNS providers respond with
reasonable latency. This would aid users in the choice of DNS
recursive resolvers. We conduct ping measurements to each of
the resolvers and calculate the median RTT for each latency
measurement.
2) DNS Resolution Time: DNS query response time is one
of the major factors that affect the speed of page rendering
in the browser. A web page normally contains several objects
fetched from different servers. In this study, we measured
DNS resolution time firstly for the main page. After that,
we collected all the unique domains for components (i.e.
images, JavaScript, CSS, among others) for each domain and
measured their respective DNS Response time. We use getdns
and libcurl C libraries to issue Do53, DoT, and DoH queries.
Getdns provides an API that allows developers to perform
DNS Do53 and DoT requests using different programming
languages. Libcurl supports POST requests to be sent via
HTTPS. This capability enables us to measure DoH response
time. We could have gotten the DNS response times from
the collected HARs; however, we noted that some of the
timings were not correct and decided to use the getdns. It
is important to note that the DNS responses were not cached
by the browser used in the measurements to ensure that the
subsequent transaction is not affected by the cache.
3) Page Load Time: Page load time is an important metric
of browser-based QoE. It represents the time a user has to wait
before the page is loaded in a browser. In this study, Firefox
was used in headless mode to visit a set of websites. We
collect HAR files in JSON format for each website containing
timing information, including blocking information, proxy
negotiation, DNS lookup, TCP handshake, SSL, Requests,
Waiting and Content download. From the HAR files, we
record the onLoad timing - the time taken to load the page
together with its components completely.
C. Analysis
We use descriptive statistics to explore the data. We
then apply Shapiro to test normality. Finally, we conduct
a pairwise comparison of the DNS filters from the same
provider using a T-test to explain their relationship. For
example, Cloudflare provides two filters; security (CFS) and
family (CFF) and one non-filter resolver (CFN) each of
which provides three DNS protocols (Do53, DoH, DoT).
In the study, we are interested in identical comparisons,
Do53 against Do53, DoT against DoT and DoH against
DoH. This gives us nine pairwise tuples {(CFN Do53,
CFF Do53), (CFN Do53, CFS Do53), (CFF Do53,
CFS Do53), (CFN DoH, CFF DoH), (CFN DoH,
CFS DoH), (CFF DoH, CFS DoH), (CFN DoT, CFF DoT),
(CFN DoT, CFS DoT), (CFF DoT, CFS DoT) ) } on which
we perform T-test.
III. RESULTS
In total, we managed to successfully download and save
492, 977 HTTP Archive Record (HAR) files from which
we obtain and analyse the page load times (PLT). Each
successfully saved HAR had a number of objects, which we
measured independently for DNS response time (DRT). This
yielded 3, 427, 808 unique domains, which translates to, on
average, ≈ 7 domains referenced by a single HAR file.
A. Latency
We used ICMP ping to measure latency. Each successfully
saved HAR file was accompanied by five ping measurements
to the recursive resolver. This metric explains the differences
in the DNS response times and page load times between
resolvers from the same provider and between resolvers from
different providers. As expected, we generally observe lower
latencies to local resolvers provided by the Internet Service
Providers. However, for some ISPs such as Telekom Networks
Malawi, MTN Zambia and MTN Nigeria, we noted higher
latencies than public resolvers such as Quad9 and Cloudflare.
We posit that this might be the case under suboptimal routing.
Also, this may be the case when ISPs choose not so highly
cached DNS resolvers.
Observing from the network conditions’ point of view,
we find the lowest latency on wired (median RTT ≈ 87ms)
network followed by Eduroam (median RTT ≈ 92ms) with the
higher latencies observed under 4G (median RTT ≈ 446ms).
We further observed differences in latencies under 4G; some
countries had lower latencies than others. Comparing differ-
ent resolvers, results indicate higher latencies to AdGuard
resolvers with a minimum RTT of ≈ 750ms. In general, the
latency results suggest that the resolvers from the same DNS
providers are colocated.
B. DNS resolution Delay
DNS response time is one of the sources of delay in
any online transaction that fetches resources from a remote
location. A web transaction, in particular, comprises multiple
name resolutions for page components such as images, scripts
and cross-site components. This section presents summaries of
DNS response times from all the measured resolvers, grouped
by DNS provider and the network conditions. Due to space
limitation, we focus our reporting on results from Cloudflare
representing the fastest DNS provider observed in this study.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show Cumulative Distribution Func-
tions (CDFs) of DNS response times for the protocols and
filters from Cloudflare. As expected, we note that Do53-
based filters perform better than their corresponding DoE-
based filters. This makes sense, considering the extra latency
brought by the TLS handshakes. Comparing DoH and DoT
from each resolver, we note that generally, DoT has higher
DNS response times than DoH except for Cloudflare resolvers
which show almost no difference. Also, we note in the 4G
results (Figure 1) that the public Do53 perform better than
the local Do53 provided by the Internet Service Providers.
We note substantial differences in response times between
filters and their respective protocols from three (Cloudflare,
Adguard and Quad 9), with minimal differences noted from
CleanBrowsing’s filters. Comparing filters and non-filters, we
note that the filters, especially DoH-based filters, provide
lower response times than their non-filtered counterparts.
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Comparably, Cloudflare resolvers perform better than the
rest of the resolvers. Prior works [9], [21] have attributed
this to the fact that Cloudflare resolvers do not support
EDNS. In this work, we did not validate this claim. We also
argue that Cloudflare has multiple points of presence in the
region. This agrees with the latency results in which Adguard
has the highest RTTs. Traceroute results show that Adguard
resolvers are not present in Africa, hence the higher RTTs.
When compared against each other, security filters outperform
family filters. This pattern is helpful as it could inform the
users of protocols or filters that would give them the best
Quality of Experience.
Of peculiar notice is the performance of Quad9’s DoT,
which is consistently poorer regardless of network conditions.
Prior works [9], [7], [2] have reported this observation.
However, we have not engaged the provider to report or seek
explanations as at writing this paper.
So far, we have observed using descriptive statistics
that there are differences between resolvers from the same
provider in terms of DNS response times. The question we ask
is, are these differences significant? To answer this question,
we conducted a T-test between the same protocols from
different resolvers. Generally, we find that the results agree
with the descriptive statistics as presented by the CDFs such
as those presented in Figures 1, 2 and 3. We observe that the
difference between filters from the same provider is mostly
significant across recursive resolvers (p < 0.001) except for
some fewer cases [(AGAd, AGF), (AGN, AGAd), (CBA,
CBS), (CFF, CFS)] where the difference is not statistically
significant.
On the other hand, we observe significant differences
between DoE-based filters. Of the providers, Adguard and
Quad9 show substantial differences (depicted by larger t val-
ues) than Cloudflare and CleanBrowsing. When we compare
the filters, we note significant differences between the non-
filter DoE resolvers and filtered resolvers. However, we note
marginal differences between the filters (i.e. substantial dif-
ferences between (CFN, CFS) and (CFN, CFF) and marginal
differences between CFS and CFF). We also note that, under
better network conditions, DoT filters are not statistically
significant.
C. Page Load Times (PLT)
Pageload time is a more direct indication of how users
experience web browsing. We have already seen the differ-
ences in query response times among the various DNS pro-
tocols under different network types across African vantage
points. This section shows how the choice of filters and
DNS providers would impact the quality of the browsing
experience. We begin by comparing different filters with
the local, non-filtered recursive resolver. This would inform
the users of the cost they are likely to incur should they
prefer open, public DoE filtering services to the Do53 service
provided by their ISPs. Finally, we will compare the DoE-
based filters with their Do53 counterparts.
Generally, we note a similar pattern between the latency,
response time and page load time results. This is unsurprising
considering that, to a greater extent, TLS-based security
protocols are mainly determined by latency due to the extra
overhead incurred during TLS handshake. Figure 4 shows
the median page load time differences between public DNS
providers and a local DNS recursive resolver. The difference
is calculated by taking the median page load time for a
website/user using one public, filter-enabled resolver minus
the median page load time of the same website/user using a
local, unfiltered resolver. Therefore, the difference is indica-
tive of the extra cost a user would bear when using secure
DNS protocols provided by public DNS resolvers compared
to default Do53. From this Figure, we note that DoT performs
better than DoH except for two cases (Cloudflare no filter and
Quad9 no filter). Q9N’s DoT displays extreme results with a
mean page load difference of about seven seconds, concurring
with the DNS response time results.
When we compare the providers, Cloudflare and Clean-
Browsing fare consistently better than AdGuard and Quad9
with a page load difference of ≈ 2 seconds. We expected
Cloudflare to perform comparably to Quad9, considering that
both have multiple points of presence in Africa. We think
that Quad9’s DoE has some protocol design or infrastructural
issues such as caching.
We also use Figure 4 to analyse the performance differ-
ences among DoE filters from the same provider with respect
to the filter’s Do53 performance. We note marginal differences
between DoT and DoH-based filters with a median page load
difference of up to 2 seconds except for Quad9’s DoT, which
we have already discussed in previous paragraphs. However,
another aim of this study is to see whether these differences
are statistically significant. We use a T-test to investigate the
similarity and differences between filters and protocols from
the same provider. We observe significant differences in the
performance of Adguard, Cloudflare and Quad9 resolvers.
Cloudflare (See Table I) generally sows significant differences
in page load times except for DoT under wired network,
suggesting that DoT’s performance between CF’s filters is
not different under better network conditions. CleanBrowsing,
however, does not show any significant differences between
its resolvers across network conditions. This is in contrast to
the DNS response time T-test results. CleanBrowsing’s filters
are not new, suggesting that they may have higher cache hits
in Africa. On the other hand, Cloudflare’s and Quad9’s filters
are new, and users and ISP’s are yet to cache them hence
the substantial difference. Adguard’s performance is attached
to the long distance from the vantage points to its points of
presence which, from the latency measurements, indicate that
they are situated offshore.
IV. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Thus far, we have presented results indicating significant
differences in DNS response time and page load times ex-
hibited by filter-enabled resolvers from the same public DNS
provider. These differences are observed from all the mea-
sured network conditions; 4G, Eduroam and Campus wired
broadband networks. The key role of DNS-based filtering













































Fig. 1: DNS response time CDF for













































Fig. 2: DNS response time CDF for













































Fig. 3: DNS response time CDF for
Cloudflare filters under wired network






































Fig. 4: Mean page load time difference between public and local recursive resolver
Pairwise PLT T-test-Cloudflare Wired Network Eduroam 4G
(CFN Do53, CFF Do53) (t=14.931, p=0.000)* (t=7.287, p=0.000)* (t=6.928, p=0.000)*
(CFN Do53, CFS Do53) (t=14.615, p=0.000)* (t=7.473, p=0.000)* (t=6.150, p=0.000)*
(CFF Do53, CFS Do53) (t=-0.316, p=0.752) (t=0.191, p=0.849) (t=-0.549, p=0.584)
(CFN DoH, CFF DoH) (t=2.651, p=0.008)* (t=3.015, p=0.003)* (t=2.090, p=0.036)*
(CFN DoH, CFS DoH) (t=2.857, p=0.004)* (t=2.809, p=0.005)* (t=1.407, p=0.160)
(CFF DoH, CFS DoH) (t=0.207, p=0.836) (t=-0.244, p=0.807) (t=-0.500, p=0.617)
(CFN DoT, CFF DoT) (t=-0.432, p=0.666) (t=2.234, p=0.026)* (t=6.225, p=0.000)*
(CFN DoT, CFS DoT) (t=0.318, p=0.750) (t=3.210, p=0.001)* (t=5.408, p=0.000)*
(CFF DoT, CFS DoT) (t=0.766, p=0.443) (t=1.136, p=0.256) (t=-0.371, p=0.711)
TABLE I: T-tests for Cloudflare’s Page load time
is to protect Internet users from malware, adware, phish-
ing, cyberbullying and pornography. The results have also
shown that DNS-based filters generally outperform their non-
filter counterparts, implying that their usage would improve
the Quality of Experience. Comparing the DNS providers,
Adguard and Quad9 perform more poorly than Cloudflare
and CleanBrowsing. Cloudflare performs consistently better
across all network conditions. From these findings, we offer
the following suggestions as possible remedies.
A. Implement local and regional DoE Infrastructure
ISPs widely use DNS level filtering as a value-added
service to their customers to block malware, enforce parental
controls, and prevent different cyber attacks. The problem
with the Do53-based filtering was its invasive nature into
the privacy of the subscribers described in the RFC [16]
and various DNS attacks. The coming of the standard DNS
privacy protocols is a relief to many security-conscious In-
ternet subscribers. The limiting factor, however, could be the
performance overhead incurred when using public resolvers.
Also, other subscribers would not be comfortable using third-
party DNS providers. This study and other prior works suggest
that the closer the resolvers are to the end-user, the better
the Quality of Experience. Therefore, we recommend that the
ISPs and Network Operators implement DoE services. This
would reduce the latency overhead and eventually improve
QoE.
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B. Offer configurable Quality of Protection to Internet Users
Internet is costly in edge networks. Because of this, pa-
ternalistic or stupid user implementation of Internet secu-
rity services may negatively impact some users from these
networks. On the other hand, the configuration of Internet
security services is not straightforward [22] imposing security
configuration overhead on the users. Consequently, most users
have developed poor mental models around security, including
DNS service, and they do not find the motivation to configure
security on their Internet access devices. We are aware of
recommendations by researchers to optimise secure DNS.
Deccio C. and Davis J. [23], connection-oriented DNS by
Zhu, et al. [24] proposed the usage of TCP Fast Open
(TFO) and TLSv1.3. Hounsel et al. [9] propose opportunistic
partial responses, wire caching and disabling of EDNS Client-
Subnet.
One possibility is to introduce an integrated, easy-to-use
cost-aware Internet security configuration framework that will
enable users to choose their desired level of security, such as
choosing the type of DNS filters in this case.
Finally, the results from this study enable both users and
ISPs to make better DNS choices based on the measurement
data and based on the trust they have in the DNS provider.
The results also inform the DNS providers on the possible
improvements and expansion of their services in Africa.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper investigated the QoE impact of public Do53 and
DoE-based filtering from African vantage points. The study
has shown that users who use DNS filters would experience
a better QoE. In some cases, the study has shown that DoE-
based filtering performs even better than Do53-based filters.
The results from this study assist Internet Service providers
and Internet users to make sound decisions when choosing
the DoE-based filters to implement. The choice of DNS filters
would improve the Quality of Protection and Experience.
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